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RECENT DECISIONS

HABEAS CORPUS-FEDERAL COURTS-MAY APPLICATION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS ADDRESSED TO ONE FEDERAL JUDGE BE HEARD BY ANOTHER JUDGE
OF THE SAME CouRT?-Petitioner applied to a specific district court judge for

a writ of habeas corpus. Following the practice of the court 1 of which he was a
member, this judge filed the petition with the clerk of the court, and it was
assigned to a second judge, who denied the petition. 2 From this decision petitioner appealed. Two questions were raised ( 1) whether a writ of habas
corpus should be granted; and (2) whether it is mandatory that a petition of
habeas corpus addressed to a specific judge of the district court be heard and
determined by that judge to the exclusion of any other judge of the same court.
On the first question it was held that there was no merit to the petition since
it was insufficient on its face. On the second question the court held that a
petition addressed to one judge of the district court need not be heard by that
particular judge but may be transferred to another judge of the same court. 8
Burall v. lohnston, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 230.

1 "Rule I of the Rules of Practice for the [particular] District Court reads: 'All
actions and proceedings of whatsoever kind or nature . . . shall be assigned to the
several judges in regular rotation by the Clerk.',, Burall v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th,
1944) 146 F. (2d) 230 at 231.
2 Burall v. Johnston, (D.C. Cal. 1943) 53 F. Supp. 126.
8 Remarking that "it may not be necessary» to decide the second question, the
court justified doing -so on the g;ound that the question continued to arise on appeal,
and cited: Snow v. Roche, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944) 143 F. {2d) 718; Rutkowski v. St.
Sure, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944) 143 F. (2d) 715; O'Keith v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944)
146 F. (2d) 231.
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The precise point decided in the principal case seems to have arisen only in
the ninth circuit. The decision arrived at involved construction of the federal
. statute empowering judges to grant writs of habeas corpus. 4 Judge Goodman;
in Wright v. lohnston,5 contends: "It is true that •.• the several Judges of this
court are empowered to grant writs of habeas corpus. It does not follow, however, that it is mandatory upon the judge, to whom a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus is addressed, to pass upon such petition; or that the petition may
not be heard and determined by the court•.•• " Judge Denman favors a more
literal interpretation of the statute. 6 He stresses the fact that section 454 of the
Judicature Act provides for application to court or judge and that section 455
declares, "The court, or justice, or judge to whom such application is made shall
forthwith award a writ. . . • " This he interprets to be mandatory upon the
judge to whom application is made, and not upon some other judge, to award
the writ. 7 The crux of the problem of statutory interpretation is whether an
application addressed to a judge may be deemed to be addressed to the court of
which he is a member-and so may be transferred to another judge of the
same court. Judge Goodman marshals several arguments in defense of the
practice of permitting an application to one judge to be filed in the court and
assigned to a member of the court. -:r:hese arguments seem also to support the
, view that an application addressed to a judge may be deemed to be addressed
to the court of which he is a member: (I) "The history of the statute •..
indicates that the empowerment of the District Judges individually to receive and
act upon such petitions was not for the purpose of enabling a petitioner to 'pick'
his judge"; its predecessor 8 permitted an individual judge to award writs only
during vacation, so that a prisoner would not be forced to await a regular session; the present statute extended the power and thus "made available to petiThe decision on the second question was presented by declaring that the law had
been incorrectly stated in Rutkowski v. Johnston, (D.C. Cal. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 430,
, and correctly stated in Wright v. Johnston, (D.G. Cal. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 748 at 749.
4 See 28 U.S. C. (1940), §§ 452, 454, 455. § 452 provides:" •.• the-several
judges of the circuit courts of appeal and of the district courts .•. shall have power
to grant writs of habeas corpus ..•. " § 454 provides: "Application for writ of habeas
corpus shall be made to the court, or justice, or judge authorized to issue the same
•••• " § 45 5 provides: "The court, or justice, or judge to whom such application
is made shall forthwith award a writ of habeas corpus ...• "
~ (D.C. Cal. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 748 at 749.
6 Rutkowski v. Johnston, (D.C. Cal. 1943) 52 F. Supp. 430.
1 Ibid. at 43'2. This emphasis upon a literal construction of the statute making
it mandatory for the particular judge to whom application is made to award the writ
seems somewhat inconsistent with the view that a circuit judge may deny a writ on
the ground that the petitioner has not made application to a district judge or court.
Sweetney v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th, 1941) 121 F. (2d) 445; U.S. ex rel. Bernstein
v. Hill, (C.C.A. 3d, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 159; O'Brien v. Swope, (C.C.A. 9th, 1939)
106 F. (2d) 471. Judge Denman himself adopts this latter position in Bowen v.
Johnston, (D.C. Cal. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 340. He seems on more solid ground
when he as~erts, "I can find no statutory warran( for a judge to whom an application .•• is not addressed assuming jurisdiction." Rutkowski v. Johnston, (D.C. Cal.
1943) 52 F. Supp. 430 at 430.
8 U.S. Rev. Stat., tit. 13, § 752 (1878).
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tioners broad opportunity to be heard." 9 (2) "No harm or injury can be
done to the petitioner by having his petition assigned according to the rules
and heard and determined by one of the judges of the court." 10 (3) The propriety of such action has been recognized in previous decisions.11 Apart from
authority and statutory construction, the decision ( or dictum) in the principal
case would appear to be a good one. Little can be said in support of a right
to "pick" the particular judge before whom a petition for habeas corpus shall
be heard. The crucial question is whether any injustice will be done to a
petitioner by assigning his petition to a member of a district court according to
the rules of the court. It seems clear that none will. A petitioner for a writ
of habeas corpus is by statute expressly granted the right of appeal to the circuit
court of appeals from the final order of a district court or a district or circuit
judge.12 Moreover, a petitioner has the right to challenge a judge for bias by
0
Wright v. Johnston, (D.C. Cal. 1943) 49 F. Supp. 748 at 749-50. Is there
adequate basis for interpreting U.S. Rev. Stat., tit. 13, § 752 (1878), to permit an
individual judge to grant a writ only during vacation? The statute itself is silent on
the point. Judge Goodman cites State v. Sullivan, (C.C. N.C. 1892) 50 F. 593; Ex
parte Everts, (C.C. Ohio 1858) F. Cas. No. 4,581. These cases do not seem adequate
support for the proposition.
10
Wright v. Johnston, id. at 750.
11
Id. at 750.
Ex parte Clarke, IO Otto (100 U.S.) 399 at 403 (1879): In deciding that the
Court has jurisdiction where the petition for habeas corpus has been presented to a
single justice and a writ issued by him and made returnable to the Court, the Court
says: " • . . we see no good reason why he should not have taken this course, as he
did. It had merely the effect of making the application for a discharge one addressed
to the court, instead of one addressed to a single justice. This has always been the
practice of English judges in cases of great consequence and difficulty, and we do not
see why it may not be done here." Commenting on this decision, in Bowen v. Johnston,
(D.C. Cal. 1944) 55 F. Supp. 340 at 341, Judge Denman interprets it as applying
to a case where an individual judge feels that the problem involved is too difficult to
·be decided by a single judge and so makes the writ returnable to a court in plenary
session. Further, he contends the statements of the Court are to be considered "dicta,"
because the petition was addressed to the judges of the Supreme Court, citing Ex
parte Clarke, supra this note, at 400. The force of this latter contention is weakened
by the fact that the Court treats the petition as one presented to a single justice and
expressly declares, "The justice who issued it could undobutedly have disposed of the ·
case himself ..• "; Ex parte Clarke, supra this note, at 403. At the time of this decision
the applicable statute, U.S. Rev. Stat., tit. 13, §§ 751-766 (1878), gave both courts
and judges power to grant writs of habeas corpus. On the authority of Ex parte Clarke,
In re Fitton, (C.C. Vt. 1891) 45 F. 471 at 472, declares it proper for a judge to
take an application made to him personally into the court of which he is judge. In
_Blagiach v. Tope, (C.C.A. D.C. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 995 at 996, the court declares, "it
was perfectly proper that on return of the writ the cause should be heard by another
judge" than the judge of the same court who issued the writ; but it is not clear
whether this case is in point, because it is not stated to whom the application was
made, and the petitioner raised the question of jurisdiction for the first time on appeal.
12 By 28 U.S.C. (194-0), § 463. See Webb v. York, (C.C.A. 8th, 1896) 74 F.
753; Craig v. Hecht, 263 U.S. 255 at 27f, 44 S.Ct. 103 (1923).
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filing an affidavit and stating the facts and reasons supporting his belief. 13 The
rule permitting the assignment of a petition to a judge of the same court other
than the judge to whom the petition was addressed would seem to permit more
expeditious handling of a court's business,14 to protect a petitioner from delay
when the judge addressed is incapacitated, 15 and to avoid the necessity for filing
a new application in cases where for some reason it is improper for the judge
to whom the petition is addressed to hear the petition. 16
G. R. Thornton

See 28 U.S.C. (1940), § 25.
Burall v. Johnston, (C.C.A. 9th, 1944) 146 F. (2d) 230 at 231.
15 Ibid.
16 Blagiach v. Tope, (C.C.A. D.C. 1935) 76 F. (2d) 995.
13

14

